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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNETTE U. SWAN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
Case No. 14823 
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB, 
and DR. DENNIS D. THOEN, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS APPLICATION 
OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE PREJUDICIALLY 
AFFECTED PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO PROPERLY 
QUALIFY HER EXPERT WITNESS. 
Both defendants admit in their briefs that 
the trial court disallowed testimony from plaintiff's 
expert, Dr. Peter M. Rocovich, because he had no 
"personal contact or experience within the state of 
Utah." Tr. day 3 at 118; 4 at 6-7; Brief for Respon-
dent Dr. Thoen at 15, 40; Brief for Respondent Dr. 
Lamb at 8. It thus appears uncontested that the trial 
court applied what plaintiff has characterized as the 
"strict" rather than the "similar" locality rule. Dr. 
Lamb, however, unlike Dr. Thoen, argues that, for pur-
poses of this case, it is not important which of the 
said "locality" rules was applied. See Brief for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Respondent Dr. Lamb at 11; Brief for Respondent Dr. 
Thoen at 19-34, 37. Dr. Lamb's position in this 
respect is erroneous. 
For an expert witness to be permitted to 
testify when the "strict locality" is applied, he 
must show knowledge and familiarity with the relevant 
methods and customs of medical practice within a 
specific geographic locality. According to the rule, 
said knowledge and familiarity must have been acquired 
through personal contact and experience with that 
locality and its physicians. On the other hand, under 
the "similar locality rule," such a witness need only 
show knowledge and familiarity with the relevant methods 
and customs of medical practice in localities of similu 
makeup to the area in question. There is no need to 
demonstrate first-hand acquaintance with the area itself· 
Clearly where an expert witness claims familiarity 
with the standard of care in a locality, not on the basis 
of his first-hand contacts with that locality, but on 
the basis of his contacts and experiences in and with 
localities of a similar nature, the court selection of 
either a "strict" or a "similarly" locality rules, will 
make all the difference in the world in whether that 
expert will be allowed to testify. 
Dr. Thoen, agrees that had the trial court 
allowed testimony as to the similarity of medical 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
factors in Los Angeles as compared to Salt Lake City, 
Dr. Rocovich's testimony on the standard of care 
may have been allowed. See Brief for Respondent Dr. 
Thoen at 37. Since evidence of similarites between 
the two areas did not enter into the trial judge's con-
sideration in making his ruling, it is obvious which 
"locality" rule he applied, and that such application 
was important to the outcome of the case. The only 
way in which the decision of that court can be affirmed 
is by adoption in Utah of the "strict locality rule." 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DR. THOEN'S ARGUMENT FOR 
EXISTING WIDE ACCEPTANCE AND APPLICATION 
OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE FAILS TO 
CONSIDER THE FULL RANGE OF COURT PRO-
NOUNCEMENTS, IN THE JURISDICTIONS CITED, 
WHICH SHOW THE CONTRARY. 
Dr. Thoen argues that Utah has a long 
tradition of following the strict locality rule and 
claims that such a rule is "absolutely necessary" in 
Utah. See Brief for Respondent Dr. Thoen at 19, 23. 
Interestingly, Dr. Lamb recognized no such "necessity." 
In fact, Dr. Lamb appears to argue that the Utah standard 
is and should be the "similar locality rule." See Brief 
for Respondent Dr. Lamb at 10-19. Such confusion in 
the perceptions and positions of the defendants is 
supportive of plaintiff's argument, as stated in her 
initial brief, that the law in Utah is neither clear 
-3-
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nor established. Not until this appeal has the Utah 
Supreme Court had to decide precisely what the Utah 
Medical Standard of Care was. 
Dr. Thoen undertakes to discredit plaintiff's 
position that the strict locality has been adopted in 
only a small minority of American jurisdictions, by 
reporting the results of his "exhaustive study" of 
U.S. medical standards which he claims show that no 
less than 17 states presently apply the strict locality 
rule in medical malpractice cases. See Brief for 
Respondent Dr. Thoen at 22 et seq. 
Plaintiff examined some of the cases to which 
Dr. Thoen referred and investigated the laws of some 
of the jurisdictions cited. Certain discrepancies came 
to light in that investigation. For instance, Coleman 
v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975), is cited in support 
of the proposition that Delaware uses a strict community 
standard. It is true that the footnote in Coleman from 
which Dr. Thoen gleans his information reads as follows: 
The settled rule in Delaware is that 
a surgeon is bound to the same standar~s of 
care and competence as other surgeons in 
good standing ordinarily adhere to in the 
community. DeFilippo v. Preston, D~l.Supr., 
173 A.2d 333 (1961); Christian v. Wilmington 
General Hospital Association, Del.Supr., 135 
A.2d 727 (1957). Coleman, Supra at 10, n.2. 
h foot-The DeFilippo case, however, cited int e 
note, clarifies that "community" as used in Coleman, 
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means "the same or a similar community:" 
The general rule is that a surgeon is 
bound to the same standards of care and 
competence as other surgeons in good standing 
ordinarily adhere to in the same or a similar 
community. 41 Arn.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, 
§82; 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons, §43. 
This general rule is also the law of Delaware. 
Christian v. Wilmington General Hospital, 11 
Terry 550, 134 A.2d 727; Mitcnell v. Atkins, 
6 W.W. Harr. 451, 178 A. 593. See DeFilippo, 
supra at 336. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Delaware standard would appear to be the "similar 
locality rule" rather than the "strict locality rule" 
as represented by Dr. Thoen. 
Dr. Thoen also suggests that the Illinois standard 
is the strict locality rule and cites Mann v. Sanders, 
173 N.E.2d 12 (Ill.App. 1961). However, in a later case, 
a broader statement explaining the nature of such a 
"locality" appeared: 
[I] llinois ... [follows] the "locality rule" 
under which a defendant doctor is bound to 
exercise such care and diligence as a good 
practitioner practicing in a same or similar 
community or hospital. Borowski v. VonSolberg, 
14 Ill.App.3d 672, 303 N.E.2d 146 (1973). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Such language is not reflective of the existence of a 
strict locality rule in Illinois. (Note that the statement 
is broad enough to cover general practitioners and 
specialists alike.) 
While it is not doubted that Dr. Thoen intended 
to accurately represent to the Court the current status 
nf the law in sister states, it appears that at least some 
-5-
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of the cases cited do not contain information which is 
complete enough to allow for a determination as to whi~ 
standard of care really governed. It can be supposed 
that in others of the cases cited by Dr. Thoen, a proper 
factual setting for a definitive pronouncement concerning 
the standard of care to be applied might have been 
lacking, thereby making any prouncement thereon merely 
dicta. (See Brief for Appellant Swan at 14-20 for a 
discussion of this characteristic as concerns Utah.) 
Plaintiff considers herself to have made no mistake 
in stating that the strict locality rule is still 
viable in only a small minority of American jurisdictions. 
POINT III 
ARGUMENTS MADE BY DR. LAMB CONCERNING 
DR. ROCOVICH'S CREDENTIALS ARE NOT 
MATTERS AFFECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF HIS TESTIMONY, BUT, RATHER, THE 
WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN IT. 
Defendant Dr. Lamb devotes a considerable 
portion of his brief to the argument that because Dr. 
Rocovich was not a board certified specialist he was 
incompetent to express an opinion concerning the 
conduct of the defendants. Dr. Lamb complains that: 
Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case 
where a doctor who is not board certified 
in his own speciality has been allowed to 
testify as to the standard of care.or d 
qualifications of a defendant who is boar 
certified in a different specialty. The 
situation is ludicrous on its face. We 
submit that no such condition should ever 
-6-
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be permitted to exist. Brief for Respondent 
Dr. Lamb at 22. 
There are actually a number of cases which could 
be cited to show that experts not only need not be board 
certified but need not be specialists in order to explain 
the standard of care applicable to specialists. In Harris 
v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1967), the testimony of 
a general practitioner was allowed on the standard of 
care of a Nebraska specialist in orthopedic surgery. In 
Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953), 
an 82 year-old general practitioner who had been retired 
for 20 years was held competent to testify as to the 
standard of care for an orthopedic surgeon. The witness 
said he kept abreast of medical and surgical progress 
through the reading of texts and medical journals. Again 
in Steinberg v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 364 F.2d 266 
(5th Cir. 1966), a general practitioner testified for 
the plaintiff as an expert witness in a case involving 
alleged malpractice by a plastic surgery specialist. For 
additional references see comments and analysis in 
Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1163 (1970); Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 275 
(1972); 31 Arn.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence §§105-107 
(1967). 
The general rule in this regard is that a physician 
or surgeon is not imcompetent to testify as an expert 
though he is not a specialist in the particular branch 
of medicine involved in the case. See 31 Arn.Jur.2d 
-7-
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Expert and Opinion Evidence §106 (1967). 
If a physician who is duly licensed by the 
proper authorities to engage in the general 
practice of his profession says that, assuming 
a hypothetical statement of facts to be true, 
he can express an opinion satisfactory to 
himself as to a question or science pertaini~ 
to a particular branch of medicine, he is n~ 
precluded from testifying as an expert simply 
because he is not a technical specialist in 
that particular department. Id. 
Some states, such as California, go beyond a 
mere licensure requirement and ask that a witness show 
that he has "occupational experience" with the procedure 
in question. See Pearce v. Linde,113 Cal.App.2d 627, 
248 P. 2d 506 (1952). Other states, such as New Jersey, 
require only that an expert show knowledge of and 
familiarity with the procedure from private study, 
observation or consultation. See Carbone v. Warburton, 
11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953). Speciality certification 
under either system is not at all determinitive of 
admissibility of testimony but goes merely to the 
weight to be attached to it. See Baerman v. Reisinger, 
124 D.C.App. 180, 363 F.2d 309 (1966); Hawkins v. Schof~, 
204 S.2d 336 (Fla.App. 1967); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 
1163 (1970); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 275 (1972); 31 ~ 1 
Expert and Opinion Evidence §106 (1967). When Dr. Lamb, 
in his brief, argues that Dr. Rocovich was unfit to 
testify because he was not board certified and because 
he had testified in other malpractice cases, he is 
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mistaking matters which will affect the weight to be 
given the doctor's testimony for matters which will 
affect its admissibility. Matters of weight are for 
the jury. 
The only reason for a court to require that 
a plaintiff's expert be a specialist would be if the 
medical procedures involved were of such a specialized 
nature as to be, by a witness' own admission, outside 
the area of his knowledge and familiarity. Of course, 
such was not the case with the myelogram and spinal 
decompression laminectomy procedures performed upon 
plaintiff by the defendants. Each was a common place 
procedure. Dr. Lamb said he had performed thousands 
of back operations of the type performed upon the 
plaintiff. Brief of Respondent Dr. Thoen at 5-6. Dr. 
Dalrymple, an internist, on questioning by counsel 
for Dr. Lamb, stated that he knew that the standard 
of care was in orthpedic surgery. Brief for Respondent 
Dr. Lamb at 5; Tr. day 1 at 68-69. When Dr. Rocovich 
testified that he had performed over 1,000 different 
myelogramsand over 1,000 spinal decompression laminectomies, 
he overcame any objection that defendants could raise 
concerning his credentials with respect to either procedure. 
Tr. day 3 at 109. 
As for Dr. Lamb's assertion that it would be 
ludicrous to allow a non-board certified doctor to 
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testify regarding the standard of care in a board 
certified specialty, Dr. Thoen, for one, stated that 
the standards for both certified and noncertified 
specialists were the same in his field. Tr. day 3 at 6. 
It is hardly ludicrous to allow testimony from a 
noncertified specialist in light of such an admission. 
Neither is it ludicrous to suggest that a noncertified 
specialist or even an internist, for that matter, should 
be able to testify as to those things for which he 
professes proper knowledge and familiarity. 
Finally, it is suggested by Defendant Lamb 
that Dr. Rocovich is a "foreign quack," a "charlatan," 
and "nothing more than a professional witness without 
either professional qualifications or conscience." 
Brief for Respondent Dr. Lamb at 24. This unfortunate 
attack on a fellow professional is a most regrettable 
but nevertheless accurate indication of the kind of 
vicious collegial pressure that is brought to bear on a 
lone· doctor who dares call them as he sees them when he 
sees malpractice. Dr. Rocovich has been a highly 
respected and able teacher as well as practitioner of 
neurosurgery for more than two decades. He has headed 
neurosurgical departments in two major U.S. hospitals 
and has helped to train interns and residents in the verY 
fields in which defendants specialize. He has proven 
his expertise in the performance of thousands of 
-10-
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delicate operations and relieved much pain and suffering 
through the exercise of his considerable skills and 
abilities. It was in recognition of the very talents 
which defendants claim were lacking, that the trial 
court allowed Dr. Rocovich to express his expert 
opinion on the causation question. See Brief for 
Respondent Dr. Thoen at 13; Tr. day 4 at 46-47. Dr. 
Lamb's unjustified comments help to demonstrate why 
a conspiracy of silence exists among doctors who must 
continue to practice in communities where they might 
otherwise be called upon to testify. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ATTACK THE NATIONAL STANDARD 
TEST WITH INAPPOSITE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING 
UTAH'S RURAL CHARACTERISTICS EVEN THOUGH 
THEY ADMITTED BEING GOVERNED THEMSELVES 
BY A NATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE. 
Both defendants oppose the adoption in Utah 
of a national standard of care. The chief objections 
to the application of such a rule seem to center 
around the argument that Utah is a sparsely populated 
Western state of essentially rural character whose doctors 
are isolated from or too busy to keep up with today's 
medical advancements. Dr. Thoen suggests that the 
application of a national standard in Eastern urbanized 
states "may be expected" since high levels of skill 
and superior facilities are more available there. Brief 
-11-
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for Respondent Dr. Thoen at 43. It is nevertheless 
conceded that the states of Arizona, Texas, Washington 
and others, whose population distributions are not unlike 
Utah's have readily adopted national medical standards of 
care. Brief for Defendant Dr. Thoen at 39-40. 
The raising of hypothetical "rural" arguments 
against the national standard, is actually inappropriate 
in this case. It is important to note that Defendant Ors. 
Lamb and Thoen were practicing specialists with access 
to the most modern and advanced equipment available in 
several nearby fully accredited hospitals in the largest 
and most urban city of a state with a nationally superior 
physician population ratio--in many cases double that of 
her neighboring states. Brief for Respondent Dr. Thoen 
at 53. Both of the said defendants admitted being governed 
by a national standard in their respective practices. 
Brief for Appellant Swan at 44-45; Tr. day 2 at 2, Tr. 
day 3 at 5-6, 67. Such conditions clearly do not indicate 
that a national standard would have any oppressive effect 
on the defendants. 
Dr. Thoen attempts to cause undue concern for 
the adoption of a national standard by relating hypotheticai 
"horror stories" of small towns losing their doctors a~ 
of treatment costs skyrocketing. Brief for Respondent 
Dr. Thoen at 26, 47-48. Dr. Thoen asks rhetorically 
woul6 
whether a town with an inadequately qualified doctor 
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be better off with no doctor at all. Id. at 26. The 
answer could well be yes. If the doctor's lack of 
qualifications resulted in his misdiagnosis of classically 
diagnosible illnesses, his unnecessary surgery on healthy 
tissue, or his prescription of needless or possibly even 
harmful medications, a town could easily be better off 
without him. Fortunately, however, such a question need 
not be answered since the national standard test would 
in no way tend to drive doctors away from small towns. 
Dr. Thoen expresses concern that a national 
standard would hold the small town baby-delivering 
general practitioner to the "level of knowledge" possessed 
by a board certified obstetrician. Id. at 57. Such is 
not the case. The national standard is a standard of 
care, not of knowledge. The general practitioner treating 
a heart patient need not have all the knowledge of a 
cardiologist. But if he attempts open-heart surgery in 
other than serious emergency situations, he should be 
held to the standard of care for such surgery. If that 
standard is set by specialists, so be it. If one is 
going to "play the game" he had better "know the rules." 
Rural general practitioners know this and are not 
threatened by it. They do not perform heart bypass 
surgeries or prosthetic joint replacements, nor should 
they. They know when something is beyond their skill or 
understanding and frequently rely on specialists for 
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consultation as well as for referral of patients 
whose problems may go beyond their abilities to treat. 
Defendants do not suggest that when the courts 
of Massachusetts, Kentucky, Maryland, Wisconsin, Texas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Arizona, New Jersey and Washington 
adopted the national standard, the doctors in said states 
left their practices, altered their procedures or caused 
a state of panic in the populace. Such things did not 
happen there and will not happen in Utah. It is to be 
expected that prior to the adoption of any new rule the 
stories concerning its anticipated affects will abound. 
The imaginary problems which such stories describe are 
characteristically disconcerting but nonetheless unreal. 
They should be identified and considered as being the 
scare tactics which they are. 
POINT V 
BY PERMITTING A NON-RESIDENT EXPERT WITNESS 
TO TESTIFY FOR A PLAINTIFF IN A MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CASE A COURT DOES NOT REDUCE 
THE CONSIDERABLE BURDEN OF PROOF WHICH THE 
PLAINTIFF HAS. 
It should be emphasized that a pronouncement 
by this Court of a standard which would permit a properlY 
qualified nonresident physician to testify as an expert 
for a plaintiff in a Utah medical malpractice case, 
would not lessen a plaintiff's burden of proof. on the 
contrary, by allowing plaintiff's nonresident expert 
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to testify, the Court only allows plaintiff to survive 
a motion to dismiss his action. It does not give him 
a favorable verdict. A plaintiff generally still must 
show by expert testimony that a physician violated a 
standard of care set by the medical profession itself, 
not the courts or the jury. Plaintiff must also show 
by expert testimony that the said violation, if any, 
was the proximate cause of an injury suffered by him. 
Then he must show that his injuries resulted in 
compensable damages. Finally, plaintiff must get_a 
jury to believe the evidence that he presents. Failure 
of proof on any element of his case is fatal to his 
cause. 
As attested by the recent medical malpractice 
cases which have survived motions to dismiss in Salt Lake 
County, the mere fact that a case reaches the jury does 
not mean that the plaintiff will recover damages. Of eleven 
medical malpractice cases in Salt Lake County which 
went to the jury between the years 1973 and 1976, eight 
of them resulted in jury verdicts of no cause of action. See 
Records on file with the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office.: 
Nelson v. Peterson, No. 204648 (3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, July 
16, 1973), verdict: no cause of action; Cahoon v. McKay, 
No. 205196 (3d Dist., s.L.Co., Utah. November 12, 1973) 
verdict: no cause of action; Maxfield v. Cleqg:, No. 206682 
(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, June 24, 1974), verdict: no 
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cause of action; Herrera v. Barton, No. 207735 (3d Dist., 
SL.LCo., Utah., August 26, 1974), verdict: $10,039.82; 
Chealez v. St. Mark's Hospital, No. 210376 (3d Dist.,s. 
L.Co., Utah, September 12, 1974), verdict: $5,202.00; 
Allred v. Davis, No. 208981 (3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, 
November 6, 1974), verdict: no cause of action; Ollerton 
v. Carson, No. 210500 (3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, November 11} 
197 4) , verdict: no cause of action; Martinez v. Armstronc, 
no. 218595 (3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, February 26, 1975), 
verdict: no cause of action; Jones v. Nielsen, No. 22545i 
(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, March 8, 1976), verdict: no 
cause of action; Osguthorpe v. Broadbent, No. 212598 
(3d Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, May 17, 1976), verdict: no 
cause of action; Richman v. Pemberton, No. 225996 (3d 
Dist., S.L.Co., Utah, November 8, 1976), verdict: 
$50,000.00. (Interestingly, in many of the said cases, 
the Third District Court allowed testimony from out-of-
state experts.) 
Even when a plaintiff's case overcomes a motion 
to dismiss, a defendant doctor has the opportunity to 
elicit testimony exposing and attacking the biases or 
weaknesses of plaintiff's expert, including his credenti~ 
qualifications and background. He can pit his testimony 
· st 
and that of a battery of experts, if he chooses, again 
the opinion of what may be the only expert witness which 
a plaintiff's meager resources allow him to secure. 
-16-
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants do not need the additional advantage which 
is given them under the terms of a "strict locality 
rule." 
It is both serious and costly for a person, 
even though damaged, to sue a medical professional in 
Utah. A lawsuit cannot, in light of exacting statutory 
requirements, be brought first and an investigation of 
the basis for the claim be conducted later. (See the 
rigorous requirements for serving advance notice of 
intent to commence malpractice action in §78-14-8, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953.) By the time a case has reached 
the trial stage, a plaintiff will have incurred 
considerable expense securing his expert witnesses who 
must leave busy and demanding practices in order to be 
present in court to testify.· There must be some certainty 
as to whether the expert will pass muster before the 
court. 
In cases such as the present one, where un-
settled questions of law were pivotal to the case, the 
trial judge could have taken defendant's motion to 
dismiss under advisement, submitted the case to the 
jury, and, if he felt it necessary, overturned a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff by entering a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdic~ on grounds of incompetent 
expert testimony. Then, in the event of reversal on 
appeal, this Court would only have to reinstate the 
jury verdict without causing plaintiff to incur the 
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expense of a second trial. 
CONCLUSION 
As pointed out by Dr. Lamb, the trial judge 
has wide discretion in judging the qualifications of 
an expert witness. Brief for respondent Dr. Lamb at 
22-23. However, he must utilize correct principles of 
law as criteria for judging credentials of the prof erred 
expert. Failure to do so would constitute a prejudici~ 
error and would result in reversal of his decision. In 
the instant case the trial judge applied the strict 
locality rule as the standard of care for physicians 
and surgeons in Utah. Since this was not the correct 
standard to apply, the judgment in the case should be 
reversed with instructions on the proper standard, and 
remanded for a new trial 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of 
December, 1977. 
HANSEN & ORTON 
(J) 
NSEN t 
Attorney or Plaintiff/Appellan 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
